

STATEMENT
MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR
TO THE COMMITTEE ON
MILITARY AFFAIRS

OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 1916



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The occasion is ripe for this Congress to perform a service of the very greatest importance to the people of this country. The attention of the people has been directed toward the subject matter and is now concentrated upon it. One of the fundamental reasons for the adoption of a Constitution for the Union was to provide for the common defense. Proper measures have never been taken to this end in time of peace. The people of the country are now insisting that such proper measures shall be taken. They are looking to those who represent them in the National Government to do that which is wise and proper. It is a great opportunity and a great responsibility, which can only be met properly by the fullest appreciation of the magnitude of the issue and of the imperative and vital necessity of wise action concerning it. The integrity of the Nation and its very existence may depend upon what is done in this matter at this time. This great opportunity will be lost unless a wise, sensible, and practical military policy is the result of the consideration and action of this Congress.

I take it that the people have passed beyond the point of requiring further debate or reasons for the necessity for such action. I have endeavored briefly to set forth those fundamental considerations, showing such necessity, in the annual report submitted by me to the President, and shall not here repeat the same. I propose, with your permission, to address myself now to the question of the policy to be adopted.

Before coming to specific recommendations it is necessary to deal with those general considerations which must be in mind before any proper determination can be reached.

Besides continental United States, including Alaska, our military responsibilities embrace Porto Rico, the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, and the small force making part of the international guard of the railroad from Tientsin to Peking, in China. We have determined and announced that the sovereignty of the other Republics on this hemisphere shall remain inviolable, and must therefore at all times stand ready to make good our position in this connection.

We have erected coast defenses, which, more properly termed, are harbor defenses, at various places in continental United States and elsewhere, and have stationed troops of the different arms of the service in this country and in the other places mentioned. At this time we have a combatant force of 765 officers and 14,148 enlisted men of Cavalry; 252 officers and 5,535 enlisted men of Field Artillery; 1,562 officers and 35,938 enlisted men of Infantry, exclusive of 182 officers and 5,733 enlisted men of Philippine Scouts; 249 officers and 1,942 enlisted men of Engineers; 106 officers and 1,472 enlisted men of Signal Corps; and in addition thereto 715 officers and 19,019 enlisted men of Coast Artillery. These troops on June 30 last were distributed as follows:

Geographical distribution.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.
In the United States.....	3,502	64,756	68,258
In Alaska.....	23	747	770
In the Philippine Islands:			
Regular Army.....	455	12,454	12,909
Philippine Scouts.....	182	5,430	5,612
In China.....	45	1,361	1,406
In Porto Rico.....	37	670	707
In Hawaii.....	322	9,199	9,521
In the Isthmian Canal Zone.....	192	6,151	6,343
Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations.....	40	427	467
Total.....	¹ 4,798	² 101,195	105,993

¹ Includes 97 first lieutenants of the Medical Reserve Corps on active duty.

² Includes 3,993 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps and 4,388 enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps.

These are all the forces directly raised, supported, and controlled by the Federal Government.

The only other military force in the country is the National Guard. All of the States and the District of Columbia, excepting the State of Nevada, maintain units of militia, raised, officered, trained, and governed by the respective States, armed by the United States, which also prescribes the type of organization and the discipline.

The Federal Government appropriates directly for the militia approximately on an average \$6,000,000 annually.

For the support of the Army the current appropriation is \$101,959,195.87. In general, this is divided as follows:

Pay, etc.....	\$48,974,442.52
Subsistence.....	9,943,384.64
Transportation.....	10,626,518.00
Clothing and equipage.....	6,693,000.00
Regular supplies.....	7,661,360.00
Barracks and quarters.....	2,467,558.00
Incidental expenses.....	1,872,163.00
Water and sewers.....	1,656,254.00
Roads and walks.....	600,000.00
Miscellaneous appropriations Quartermaster Corps not included in above.....	1,653,075.71

Ordnance Department.....	\$7, 675, 000. 00
Medical Department	810, 000. 00
Office Chief Signal Officer.....	659, 500. 00
Engineer Department.....	142, 000. 00
Contingencies of the Army.....	25, 000. 00
Office Chief of Staff.....	72, 600. 00
Adjutant General's Department.....	326, 940. 00
Under Chief of Coast Artillery.....	28, 000. 00
Bureau of Insular Affairs.....	1, 800. 00
Miscellaneous	70, 600. 00

It will be perceived that the item of pay, including the different compensations paid to the Army personnel, nearly equals the amount expended for all other purposes; that subsistence requires almost 10 per cent of the total appropriation; transportation a fraction more than 10 per cent; equipage, including clothing, nearly 7 per cent; regular supplies, 7.52 per cent. And the remaining principal items are ordnance, 7.53 per cent; medical, 0.79 per cent; barracks and quarters, 2.42 per cent; incidental expenses, 1.84 per cent; water and sewers at military posts, 1.62 per cent; roads, walks, wharves, and drainage, 0.59 per cent. These items taken together aggregate at least 97 per cent of the total expenditures for the support of the Army.

The amounts paid for upkeep of buildings are extremely small; for light, water, fuel, etc., they contrast favorably with any private establishment of any considerable size. Supplies are purchased as cheaply as possible, and each post buys in its own locality unless we can furnish them as cheaply or cheaper from a center of distribution. Pay, allowances, clothing, etc., are fixed and regulated by law. The item of transportation seems large, but the reasons therefor are convincing when the facts are realized. Apart from our water transportation, in connection with our outlying garrisons, the vast spaces in this country explain the large amount paid for this item. Since this matter of area in continental United States enters into many other phases of the problem besides transportation, it is useful to state the following facts in connection therein. If you consider the area of the United States, including Alaska, as 100 per cent, the combined areas of all the following countries are but 97 per cent thereof. The area of each, expressed as a percentage, is also included:

	Per cent.
Austria-Hungary.....	6. 66
Belgium.....	. 31
British Isles.....	3. 34
Bulgaria.....	1. 05
Denmark.....	. 43
France.....	5. 64
Germany.....	5. 76
Greece.....	. 69

	Per cent.
Italy-----	3.06
Japan-----	4.46
Portugal-----	.99
Russia (in Europe)-----	57.95
Spain-----	5.41
Turkey (in Europe)-----	1.73

Neither Austria-Hungary, France, nor Germany is as large as Texas; each is about twice the size of Colorado; Japan is about the size of California, Italy of Nevada, and Portugal of Indiana.

It will of necessity be conceded by anyone who admits that military force is requisite at all that our present military force is totally inadequate to meet our responsibilities.

The only other provision with respect to military force is the volunteer law. Under it, after Congress has specified the number of men to be raised, the Executive may issue calls, make allotments, and set about recruiting, examining, enlisting, clothing, arming, organizing, officering, sheltering, training, and disciplining volunteers. The chaos which a crisis always produces where preparations in advance have not been made makes it certain that several months would of necessity intervene after the outbreak of war before any considerable number of volunteers would be ready to take their training, and months of training must then ensue before they would be ready to be sent into battle. In addition to the personnel, accumulated matériel must also have been prepared, for the great lengths of time must be considered which are necessary to produce it.

Before the question can be taken up of the wise solution of the problem we must, first, determine exactly what the problem is that we are seeking to solve. There is a disposition upon the part of some to assume that we are facing a crisis and must immediately set about meeting it. Their disposition is to ask that all those measures should be taken which would tend to the immediate preparation of this country for immediate warfare. If their assumption is correct, then, of course, their conclusion is correct also. The only way to meet any emergency is by adopting emergency measures. The personnel and matériel needed for military purposes should be immediately mobilized. Every nerve should be strained, and every resource drawn upon, and nothing overlooked necessary to preserve and defend us. Nothing would be proper in this view short of immediate measures vesting the fullest authority in the executive departments to proceed regardless of cost and of other considerations.

This, however, in my judgment, is not the proper view to take nor the proper procedure to be followed.

In my view the occasion calls for the adoption of a wise, sensible, adequate military policy on permanent lines and for definite ends.

Not considering for the present the situation outside of continental United States and confining ourselves thereto, and not considering the harbor defenses at the present time, there is common agreement among those who have studied the subject intelligently that we should have a force of 500,000 men subject to instant call. The reasons which induce this conclusion will be found set forth in the report made to me by the War College Division of the General Staff, printed as an appendix to my own report.

Modern warfare, while it has demonstrated the increased use of mechanical instruments of war, has also demonstrated the increased use of numbers. In addition, therefore, to those with the colors subject to instant call there should be at all times in the country large numbers of men available, by reason of previous service, for military purposes.

Our immediate problem, therefore, seems to be, How shall we meet these requirements?

There can be no question that, from the standpoint solely of effectiveness, nothing would so completely meet the situation as a regular standing army of professional soldiers enlisted for a long period of time and thoroughly drilled, trained, and disciplined. Leaving aside for the present all consideration of any other matter entering into this question than that of raising such an army and maintaining it, we must give attention to the following facts: We have at this time in this country accommodation for only about 50,000 of such an army. We should, therefore, have to provide accommodation for 450,000 more. We should either have to build upon existing Government reservations or upon sites to be selected and bought all of those things necessary for the housing, training, etc., of troops, at a cost which can not even be approximated until it is determined where such new sites are to be. We should have to use everything we have in reserve and to obtain all that which we have not already necessary fully to equip this vast number. We should have to find thousands of officers competent to train these new recruits. We should have to enlarge to a very great extent all of the administrative departments to handle such an army, and should in each one of such departments have to train competent officers for their very complex and difficult tasks.

The expense attendant upon these matters which have just been briefly adverted to would amount to hundreds of millions, and the upkeep of the force, after it was fully equipped, sheltered, officered, and trained, would mean an outlay approximating half a billion dollars a year. And this without regard to keeping up fortifications and laying by the necessary reserves of matériel which it is imperative should be done. The Adjutant General of the Army, after a most careful consideration of the whole subject matter and personal atten-

tion thereto, reaches the conclusion that he can not expect under present conditions to recruit more than 50,000 men per year for the Army. Compulsory service would therefore be the only method of securing men for this service. I shall speak later concerning compulsion. It would therefore seem impracticable in the last degree to consider that the problem can be solved by providing for a standing army of the size necessary for this solution.

In addition to those practicable considerations, there are all those reasons which make against the maintenance of a large standing army in such a Nation as ours. I do not in any way share the fear of those who think that proper military preparations involve any interference whatever with the supremacy of the civil authorities. I do, however, firmly believe that in a democracy the defense of the Nation should rest upon the citizens, and not upon a professional, paid military force, constantly under arms and devoted solely to military pursuits. I think it is clear that from every standpoint we can dismiss the suggestion that the situation should be properly met by a standing army of 500,000 men constantly under arms.

The next matter for consideration, therefore, is what other military force shall be provided for outside of and in addition to whatever standing army is finally determined upon. Since the size of the standing army which shall finally be determined upon must to a large extent depend upon what other force is provided for, that question must be left for the present and we must take up the matter of the provision for such other force first.

The mind naturally turns when it begins consideration of this question toward the existing Organized Militia or National Guard in the various States. The question that instantly comes to the mind is whether it is possible and practicable to utilize this force for the requisite national purposes.

At the present time this force consists of approximately 129,000 men and officers, and it would therefore be necessary if it is to be expanded to 400,000 to add 271,000 men and officers.

If this policy should be attempted to be adopted, Congress would first have to require the States to raise and maintain all of these troops. Even if we assume that Congress has such power under the Constitution, it is difficult to see how it could make it effective. If this point is successfully passed, the States would then have to practically treble their existing equipment in the way of military facilities to take care of a force thus raised to about three times its present number. I do not know whether Congress would have any power to impose this burden upon the States, and assuming that it has the power I do not see how it could make it effective. In any event there would have to be not only acts of Congress attempting to make this policy a success, but identical contemporaneous legislation in the 48

States to make effective such acts of Congress. It seems to me that a mere statement of this situation indicates how utterly futile it is to attempt this solution.

It is essential, if we are to view this matter in any adequate way, to get down to the very truth of things, and to deal only therewith. Each State, prior to the Constitution, maintained forces of its own. It is well known to all of us that, at the time of the formation of the Constitution, there was great distrust on the part of the individual colonies of the use which might be made of the powers to be vested in the Federal Government. It is difficult for us to realize that the creation of a Federal Government such as the Constitution creates was the result of pure reason by applied intelligence, since there was no model or precedent of any value upon which to proceed. It is little short of marvelous that so wonderful a product resulted, in view of the circumstances. It was realized by the framers of the Constitution that the Nation must be empowered in the most ample manner to protect itself and the interests confided to its charge. It, therefore, vested in the Congress of the Nation the most ample and comprehensive power possible to this end. It gave it free and unqualified authority to raise and support an Army and Navy. The States, however, desired to have within their own borders military forces for their own purposes, and that right was reserved to them. It was further provided that those forces within the States might be utilized by the Nation to suppress domestic insurrection, to aid in enforcing the law, and to aid in repelling invasions. The Federal Government was granted the power of furnishing arms to those forces, to prescribe the type of organization to which they must conform, and to prescribe the discipline to be followed. The Federal authorities were given no power of government, excepting when these forces were called out for any one of the three purposes above named. The Constitution absolutely vests in the State the right to govern these troops, excepting when called out by the Federal authorities, to officer them and train them.

It has very often happened in the history of the country that the States have prevented their troops from responding to the call of the National Government; they have even ordered their disbandment to thwart the Federal Government. At all times, therefore, excepting when these forces are actually in the service of the Federal Government, under a call for one of the three purposes specified, they are under the exclusive control, government, and command of the State authorities, who raise, recruit, officer, and train them. In my view, it is utterly impossible, so long as the Constitution remains as it is, for the Federal Government to obtain the right to do anything else than the Constitution specifies, or for the State authorities to surrender legally any of the powers and rights vested therein. It is,

of course, true that the Federal Government can make appropriations of money for and on behalf of the National Guard, and can annex conditions thereto so that the National Guard or the States in which such guard exists can only obtain the money by fulfilling such conditions, but this does not and can not alter the legal situation existing under the Constitution. It may result, as long as it is acquiesced in by all parties, in a much greater participation by the Federal Government in the control, command, officering, and training of these troops than the Constitution warrants, but it would not stand the slightest legal test or strain, and there is, in my view, not the slightest doubt that no enforceable obligation can arise out of any such legislation—that is to say, any legislation which seeks to give greater right or power to the Federal Government over these forces than the Constitution warrants. It is absolutely axiomatic that jurisdiction can not be acquired by consent, and can not, of course, be any more successfully acquired by purchase. Wherever a constitution fixes the limits of jurisdiction, there they must stand until the constitution is changed.

This situation has been recognized by every attentive student of the matter almost from the very beginning of the practical operation of the Government under the Constitution. Innumerable attempts have been made to obviate the difficulties. They have usually taken the form of what is termed federalizing the militia or federalizing the National Guard. All such attempts have failed for the reason which, in my judgment, makes it certain that all such attempts will fail. So long as these troops are those raised by the States, under the Constitution they can not be governed, officered, or trained by any other authority than the State—that is, no other situation can be constitutionally produced. If by federalizing the militia it is meant to take them out from under State authority and vest jurisdiction and control under the National Government, then, of course, the matter can readily be accomplished constitutionally, and they become organized Federal troops, frequently referred to by military students as Federal Volunteers, a phase of the subject to be later dealt with. There is no one thing so free from dispute as that the basis of any proper military system must be unity of responsibility, authority, and control. It is absolutely impossible to have this essential unity under the constitutional provisions with respect to the Organized Militia or National Guard. This has been recognized, as I have just said, almost from the beginning of the Government; certainly from the time that experience served to demonstrate the utter ineffectiveness of attempting to count upon a national military system composed of those factors.

The suggestion that the situation can properly be met by some sort of provision making these troops subject to call of the Nation for

all purposes, in case of war, instead of only for the three purposes specified in the Constitution, overlooks and disregards the fundamental basic trouble which this remedy does not even touch, much less cure. The fundamental difficulty, as has just been pointed out, is not the inability of the Federal Government to utilize these troops for all purposes in time of war. It arises from the inability of the Federal Government, under the Constitution, to have that unity of authority, responsibility, and control in time of peace which it must have as the basis of any military system of any value whatever.

Without amplifying these views, I think I have sufficiently indicated the reasons why I feel that we are utterly unwarranted in attempting to erect a military system on so unstable a foundation, a foundation which, after 125 years of attempt, has been shown to be utterly insecure and without value as a basis upon which to build. Even, therefore, if there were no question about the States agreeing to raise the 271,000 additional men and officers necessary, to provide everything which it is their duty to provide for them, and to do all those things which they can constitutionally do, and to permit the Federal Government to do not only that which it constitutionally may do but things far in excess thereof, it would, in my judgment, present a foundation utterly without warrant for us to accept and build upon. No one can possibly have any higher appreciation than I have for the spirit which has animated the personnel of the National Guard, particularly during recent years. They have striven under adverse conditions and with a bad system to do the very best that they could do, and in many cases they have done excellently. If it were possible for me conscientiously to reach a conclusion which permitted the use of the militia system or the National Guard as the only other force outside of the Regular Army, I should have welcomed that conclusion. I do not see, however, how it is possible for anyone who studies the situation to come conscientiously to any such conclusion.

The National Guard, however, as it exists is a Federal asset. It is not only usable for the three purposes specified in the Constitution, but it is so circumstanced that it can volunteer for service in time of war and be taken in as it exists; that is, each unit may come in as a unit, up to and including regimental organizations. I therefore propose a large addition to the Federal aid extended to the National Guard, so that the system may be operated to its maximum capacity and be available for the Federal purposes specified in its most effective condition. As will be seen, when we come to treat of the other Federal force outside of the Regular Army which I recommend should be raised, I offer the most ample opportunity for organizations or individuals of the National Guard to come into the Federal service under the most desirable conditions.

With respect to the so-called militia pay bill, I only desire to say this: I have always felt that any pay for home training should proceed from the State and not from the Nation. I accept the judgment and verdict of the National Guard officers that pay is essential if the guard is to be maintained effectively. I have always been willing to have the Federal Government amplify its appropriations by taking over under the constitutional permission certain expenses of the States with respect to their National Guard, those expenses which concern the matters which the Constitution vests in the Federal Government. With the money thus saved the States could provide compensation for the guardsmen. Of course, if the Congress prefers the method of direct Federal pay, it is not a matter in which I have any individual judgment upon which I care to insist. I have stated my own position so that it may be perfectly clear, as it always has been to those officers and authorities of the National Guard who have been brought into contact with me on this subject.

We have now reached a point where, in my judgment, it has been demonstrated that we may not solve our problem by meeting the requirements in the way of men by either a regular standing army of the requisite number or by attempting to use the Organized Militia as the other Federal force outside of the Regular Army. We must therefore next take up the question of what such other force should be.

Many people who think that this situation has been successfully met in other places urge the adoption of the system in use in Switzerland, or that in use in Australia. There is, unfortunately, very little accurate knowledge among many who discuss this matter concerning the details and what is involved in the adoption thereof.

Very briefly, the two systems are as follows:

Every male Swiss is liable to military service from the age of 20 until the age of 50, and officers until the age of 55. Between the ages of 10 and 16, the Swiss boy receives courses of gymnastics or calisthenics in the public schools, and after the last-named age the law requires him to go on with his gymnastics and to make a beginning at musketry. Rifle shooting is a national sport, and practically every boy belongs to rifle clubs that are under national auspices. The first line, called the "elite," consists of those from 20 to 32, inclusive; the second or "landwehr" of those from 33 to 44, inclusive; the third consists of all others from 17 to 50 years of age. When a recruit reports, he is fitted with his uniform and equipment, and given a rifle, all of which must be taken care of by him and remain in his custody until the end of his military service. Recruits receive instruction from 60 to 90 days, depending upon their arm of the service. For the "elite" a repetition course of from 7 to 14 days is held every year. Sergeants and higher noncommissioned officers serve 10 repetition courses. In the "landwehr" a repetition

course of 11 days takes place every 4 years for all the different arms. All work is in the field and on the target range. Universal military service and the beginning of the work in the public schools are the most prominent elements of the Swiss system.

The Australian system likewise requires all male inhabitants to render military service. They are divided into junior cadets, of those between the ages of 12 and 14, inclusive, who serve for 2 years for 90 hours each year; senior cadets, 14 to 18 years, serve 4 years, 4 whole days, 12 half days, and 24 night drills. Variations are permissible, provided the total remains the same. Citizen forces from 18 to 26, for 8 years, in first 7 years equivalent to 16 whole days, of which at least 8 must be in camp. There are particular requirements for particular branches of the service which need not be here gone into. Musketry is carried out on Saturday afternoons throughout the year, and nearly every training locality has rifle ranges within a few miles. As in the Swiss system, the attention given in the schools to gymnastics and preliminary education along military lines, together with universal military service, are the striking features of this system.

In this country it is not believed practicable at this time to found a military policy upon either of the two essential bases of the systems just described. The National Government has no jurisdiction over the public school systems of the various States. A constitutional amendment would be required to give it any such jurisdiction. If it attempted to acquire any participation in the school work by the consent of the States, it would require contemporaneous, identical legislation in the 48 States of the Union, and this, as we all know, would consume long years of time to accomplish. In addition to this, it would require an enormous number of Federal officials to supervise the innumerable public schools scattered throughout our enormous area. Furthermore, it is not believed that the people of this country have reached the conclusion that compulsory military service is a necessity. However rational such conclusion may be, and however inevitable it may be thought that the people will eventually reach such a conclusion, it is futile to found a policy upon any such requisite at this time, if there is not reasonable hope to expect that it will receive the approval of the people at this time. If you found your system upon any such essential basis, and there is no good ground to expect that you can secure such a basis by legislative enactment, the result would be that no step whatever would be taken, and that would be a lamentable result. If, on the other hand, you adopt a practical system, based upon the voluntary action of the people, and that fails, then policies based upon universal service or some form of compulsory service will be enacted as the only remaining remedy. Proceeding along these lines, we reach the conclusion that the supplement

to the Regular Army should be a Federal force raised under the authority vested in Congress by the Constitution to raise armies, and subject solely to its legislative authority, jurisdiction, and control.

It is, therefore, proposed to raise 400,000 men, embracing the various arms of the service, in annual increments of 133,000 each. The country would be divided up into districts and each district would be called upon for its proportionate quota. If the 400 congressional districts are taken as a basis, 333 men would be required annually from each such district. The men would enlist for three years with the colors and three years on furlough. During the time of their service with the colors they would be subjected to military training. They would be armed, equipped, and officered. Their training would be done by the officers and men of the Regular Army organizations, units of which similar to those to be trained being sent to work with each such unit. They would be paid during the time of their service on the same basis as the Regular Army is paid. At first officers would be secured from those who have served in the Regular Army or the National Guard, from the officers on the reserve list of the Army, from graduates of military schools and colleges who qualify, and from the ranks of the force itself. Later it is hoped that we can obtain large numbers of proper material from the many schools and colleges throughout the country that either have or will include proper military courses, standardized under regulations of the War Department, and over which courses and training the War Department will have sufficient supervision and participation to keep informed of the results and to be able to select the best material. Thousands of young men will be graduated from these institutions each year after we have got the system in complete operation. They will furnish as fine material as any foreign army ever had for this purpose. They will not, of course, have received the highly specialized training of those in the national academy at West Point, and it is not essential that all our officers should have. We should, of course, expect, as experience demonstrated the best ways of accomplishing the end, to have service instruction and various other methods of imparting information and training so as to develop the officers to the highest practicable extent. With respect to matters of this character, as to the officers as well as to the period of training and other details thereof for the men, much has purposely been left without specification. The very best results can only be obtained by experience, and it would be folly to attempt now to crystallize these matters into definite provisions. If the Congress will fix the maximum to be required and then leave the President free to control the matter by proper regulations, the very best results can be obtained. It may very well be that different branches of the service will require different conditions of training, instruction, etc.; that in different

parts of the country different seasons of the year and different periods of training will bring the best results. Where indoor training and outdoor training can both be availed of to the best advantage, that course should there properly be followed. Where the men can be secured for outdoor training for an intensive period, longer than is possible at those places where there must be a combination, we should be free to meet that situation. The period of two months mentioned in the War Department recommendation was put in so as to have something upon which to figure, but it has always been realized by me that the eventual requirements could only be worked out properly by experiment. And I earnestly urge upon the Congress the necessity of leaving the President and the department a free hand in these respects. Incidentally it should be observed that in the Australian and Swiss systems constant changes are being made as experience demonstrates their wisdom.

The great majority of the present personnel of the National Guard are in the Guard primarily with a view to training for national service. They have an equitable right to especial consideration in the formation of any body of national citizen soldiers. Therefore it is recommended that the officers and men of the National Guard be given the right to enter the Continental Army, grade for grade and rank for rank, individually or by organizations, so far as they may desire to enter the Continental Army. Such action is required if justice is to be done. Thus free discretion and choice would be afforded this personnel either to stay in the National Guard, which will be conserved and built up on an even more liberal scale than at present, or enter the Continental Army without any loss of rank in the transfer.

For convenience of designation, this force has been called the Continental Army, but, in fact, it is a system of Federal Volunteers raised, organized, equipped, and trained in time of peace. There is absolutely nothing new in this suggestion, as it has been a result reached and expressed by the very best military authorities this country has produced. The greatest of such authorities is undoubtedly Gen. Emory Upton. On the recommendation of Gen. Sherman he was sent around the world to study the armies of Europe and Asia. This he did with great intelligence, and his report was caused to be printed by Secretary Root in 1904. Most of the great reforms in the Army of this country since that he wrote in 1880 followed his urgent recommendations. It not only met with the approval of Secretary Root and his successors, but also of Gen. Sherman and other great soldiers, who realized its value. The one great recommendation made by him, that of Federal Volunteers, to be organized, officered, and trained in time of peace, yet remains to be put into practical operation. The conclusions reached by the War Department, after a most careful study of the whole subject, resulted in

concurring in the judgment of these great students, and in urging the adoption of the recommendations for this force. Writing as late as the present year, Maj. Gen. Carter, just retired, after a careful survey of the whole field concerning our military policy, reaches a similar conclusion and recommendation. The present War College Division of the General Staff likewise reaches the same conclusion and makes the same recommendation.

It is curious to realize that as far back as 1805 the fundamental idea of this plan received actual expression. On December 31 of that year Thomas Jefferson, writing to the Secretary of War, Gen. Dearborn, inclosed a bill to be sent to Congress proceeding exactly along the lines now recommended. The only difference is that Jefferson's bill required universal military service. He classified the male population into the minor class, 18 to 21; junior, 21 to 26; middle, 26 to 35; and senior 35 to 45. He required their enrollment by districts, they being officered and trained for specified periods in each year. His plan failed in Congress, because, as he wrote on the 27th of April, 1806, "a diversity of ideas, however, among the Members, arising from partiality to local systems, defeated that." This is the only fear that those impressed with the tremendous importance of having something practical done at this time should now have. This proposition, brought forward, as we see, nearly a century and a quarter ago, coupled with the principle of compulsion, was the result of a most careful consideration of the necessities of the case, is consistent with our law, with our traditions, with the sentiments of our people, and is practicable and workable if any system of voluntary military service ever can be.

The apprehension is well grounded that in the multiplicity of counsel there will be failure. It is so easy to bring forward alluring solutions based upon attractive theories. It is very difficult, however, to weld together a complete system, well adjusted as to all its parts. Independent proposals may of themselves be extremely attractive, but unless they offer a solution of the problem they must be discarded in favor of a complete system which does offer such a solution. We can not successfully hope to determine this important issued by adopting disconnected and unrelated ideas, however desirable and attractive each one standing by itself may be.

It will not have escaped your notice that this proposed system is practically the same thing as the Swiss and Australian systems, leaving out the supervision of the public schools and work therein of a military character, and compulsory military service. If compulsory military service is now desired for the country, and legislation concerning it can be expected by the Congress, then a short provision in the act will accomplish it. Such a clause would provide that wherever the quota required of any district by a certain date is

short of the proper number a selective process to obtain that number shall be put into effect. This would give the volunteer principle its fullest possibility of producing results, and would also assure the needed personnel in case the volunteer principle failed in producing it.

Before leaving this portion of the subject it is desirable to emphasize one important feature. Even if it is not found practicable to secure the men for the Continental Army for so long a period of time as to produce marked military results in the way of training, etc., the mere fact that in time of peace a force of 400,000 men is gathered, armed, equipped, officered, and ready for instant response to the call of the Nation would be of incalculable benefit. At the present time all of these things, as has been pointed out above, must take place after the outbreak of war and the call for volunteers. They take place in the midst of chaos and confusion, and many months must elapse before the volunteers thus called out are circumstanced as this other force would be before the call is made. Certainly, it is not necessary to elaborate upon the incalculable benefit of this situation. If, in addition thereto, we can impart sufficient training and instruction to the units and the officers so that a very short period in the field after the outbreak of war would perfect them, we have attained much and the system would come as near meeting the situation as any system could short of a professional, highly trained, Regular Army constantly under arms.

We now come to the question of how large a standing army should, under the circumstances, be maintained.

The recommendations made by me were based upon these considerations. That the essential duty of the standing army, outside of its availability to the Executive for enforcing the law, suppressing domestic insurrections, garrisoning the foreign possessions and coast fortifications, and border and expeditionary duty, was the training of the citizen forces. It was worked out for me that the units of the Regular Army, aggregating about 50,000 of mobile troops and about 20,000 of Coast Artillery troops in continental United States, would be sufficient for this purpose under normal conditions. In addition it would not be necessary to shelter such a force to engage at this time in any further construction of barracks and quarters. The Adjutant General believes that he could recruit such a force but could not recruit a larger one. The expense is within proper figures for such a force. I therefore recommended the creation in two equal annual increments of 10 regiments of Infantry, 4 regiments of Field Artillery, 52 companies of Coast Artillery, 15 companies of Engineers, and 4 aero squadrons, which added to our present force and increased by the auxiliary and attendant Quartermaster Corps, Hospital Corps, Ordnance troops, etc., would make our total enlisted force 134,707 men, together with

7,086 officers; and 50 veterinarians included in the latter being the extra officers needed for the purposes of training, instruction, etc.

It has been suggested that as large or a larger number of enlisted men would result from filling up existing units to their full strength. This is so, but, in my judgment, this is not the wise and proper thing to do, and would not result in advantage. It would not give us the organizations and officers needed if our plan is to have any chance of successful operation. It would also result in a large unnecessary increase of expense. Our regimental posts would only be able to accommodate one-half of the enlisted strength of a war-strength regiment and one-half of the officers, leaving at each such post one-half of the officers' quarters unoccupied, and dividing the regiment between two posts would result in there being at each one one-half of the enlisted men, one-half of the officers, and one-half of the officers' quarters vacant. It would be undesirable, from a military standpoint, thus to separate the commands. It would be undesirable from an economical standpoint for many reasons, not only those mentioned, but in the matter of transportation, administration, etc. The officers and men of the new organizations are absolutely essential if the War Department plan is to be fairly tried out. Without them it can not hope for successful results. With them we have every hope of being able to produce results if any system of voluntary military service can be successfully worked in this country.

Suggestions are likewise made that we should have a much larger standing army than that recommended by the War Department. But if we can secure the essential features of the plan recommended by the department, I am unable to perceive the wisdom of incurring the expense and taking so large a number of men into a professional army as these suggestions would require.

It is suggested that we should have an Army of 250,000 men. In the first place, it does not seem possible, in view of all our experience, to recruit and maintain in time of peace any such Regular Army. In the next place, we have no shelter or available military accessories for any such force. We have no officers trained to take charge of and properly instruct and make proficient any such force. The cost would be very large to recruit, organize, and equip this force, leaving aside the very large expenditures necessary to house them and supply them with the necessary accessories, not to mention the large amount of reserve matériel needed therefor. In the plan of the War College Division of the General Staff, an Army of about this size is so distributed that in continental United States there would be left 121,000 mobile army troops. These are divided into four divisions. The War Department plan, as recommended by me, calls for three divisions. In the War Department plan these

divisions are at peace strength, so that they are capable of expansion. The War College Division plan proposes a two-year enlistment, with six years in reserve, and, eventually, at the end of eight years, makes up a line of 500,000 men of the Regular Army, of whom 121,000 would be with the colors and 379,000 in reserve.

This brings up an important subject, and one that is full of complexities. I do not, for one, believe that you can safely count on a force that is made of those presently in the service with the colors, plus those who are through with their active service and are back in civil life, scattered all over the country, if the force is to be your first line. It is of undoubted value to have such men under the reserve obligation, so that you can avail yourself of such of them as will undoubtedly come forward. But I have never seen any scheme worked out, which gave any promise of successful results, that considered these men as available, either as members of their original organizations or as available in mass to form new organizations. The best that I think you can expect is to have them come forward to supply wastage or be incorporated in new organizations then to be raised. If you expect anything else, you must work out some scheme by which the War Department can not only keep track of every such man but be able to convey notice to him, to get transportation orders to each one, and directions as to where he is to report. If it is believed that you can so arrange matters as to have each one report where his old organization was, so that he can assume membership therein, you are, in my judgment, imagining a vain thing. Even to assume that you can gather in different localities all over this country these reservists, and can have available at such places their equipment, and can then organize them into the respective branches in which they formerly served is to conceive a fine theory, but one which never yet has been reduced to practical form in any plan that I have seen. I therefore do not believe that it is wise or sound to base a military policy upon a first line, of whom only 121,000 are with the colors and the balance are scattered all over the vast area of this country. In the plan proposed by the War Department the first line would consist of those who are actually with the colors; that is, those in the Regular Army who are actually serving and those in the Continental Army who are actually serving. The reserves of these organizations would be available just as they would be in the War College division plan, but they are not counted upon as part of the first line.

Other suggestions are made that we should have in continental United States alone 250,000 of the Regular Army. All of what has just been said is here applicable, and, in addition thereto, the consideration that this number, added to those necessary for over-sea service, would make our annual budget for the Regular Army alone

\$200,000,000 to \$250,000,000 greater than it now is, and would be unjustified, in my estimation.

With respect to this matter of the size of the Regular Army, of the use of the National Guard, of the way to raise Federal volunteers, of the way to obtain officers, of what to do concerning reserves of man and material, and numerous other questions, many suggestions have been made and will continue to be made. This leads to what I believe is the imperative necessity, if anything whatever of value is to be accomplished at this session of the Congress. Certain general principles must be recognized as underlying the whole subject, and procedure must be had along those principles if any result worthy of the subject and of the Congress is to be reached. I sincerely believe that an attentive study of the whole subject will lead to the conclusion previously stated, that a small highly trained, highly effective Regular Army, expansible in character, Federal volunteers, raised, officered, and trained in time of peace, and the National Guard for State uses, is the best solution. It has been determined to be such by many of the greatest statesmen, soldiers, and reasoning men who have studied the matter with concentrated attention and high intelligence. None of the other suggestions so far made will stand the necessary tests. We must realize, I think, that it is our imperative duty to satisfy the expectations of the people of this country on this great subject. We can not do this unless, with wisdom, patriotism, and disinterested service, we lay the foundation for a wise, permanent military policy that is practicable, economical, and adequate.

I shall take the liberty of attaching to this statement various documents from different sources, setting forth in greater detail matter which I think you will find useful in your consideration of this subject matter.

I wish to place at your disposal every facility at my command to aid you. Upon some subjects there is, of course, only one source of information, and that is the technical experts who are informed thereon. On the general subject, however, the conclusion must of necessity be one calling for many considerations.

With respect to the coast fortifications and accumulations of reserve material, it does not seem useful to add anything to what is stated in my annual report. These two matters require an aggregate of \$46,000,000 a year for a period of four years, and this of necessity must be kept in mind in dealing with any proposed policy.

I am earnestly hopeful that the forces in the country and in the Congress that wish to see a wise, practical result reached will concentrate upon a well-rounded, well-adjusted policy, and make it effective by their action.